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CHAPTER 5 
Workmen's Compensation Law 
LAURENCES. LOCKE• 
§5.1. Personal injury vs. "wear and tear": Back injury from repeated 
stress of physical labor: Date of injury: Last insurer. In Trombetta's 
Case,1 the Appeals Court of Massachusetts held that a ruptured disc 
resulting from the cumulative effect of the stress of ordinary labor oc-
curring on the last day of employment constituted a compensable per-
sonal injury. Disregarding the defense of "wear and tear" and casting 
further doubt on its continued viability, the court confirmed the trend 
toward a broad interpretation of personal injury in the workmen's com-
pensation context. 
The claimant was a bricklayer who sustained a back injury on Sep-
tember 25, 1967, while working for an employer insured by Lumbermen's 
Mutual Casualty Company. He was paid compensation, returned to wori 
for the same company on October 16, 1967, and continued there until 
April, 1968. He had pain in his back and le~t leg while working for that 
employer, while working for a second employer from April until June, 
1968, and while working for yet another employer from June until 
August, 1968. From August 5, 1968 to December 13, 1968, the date when 
his job terminated, Trombetta worked as a bricklayer and mason for a 
fourth employer, Roberto Company, which was insured by Hartford 
Accident and Indemnity Company. Trombetta's pain in the back and 
left leg grew markedly worse during this period. He testified that he 
would have had to stop work had he not been laid off on December 13, 
1968. In October, 1968, Trombetta consulted his doctor, who x-rayed 
his back and increased the strength of pain-killing medicine previously 
prescribed. After stopping work, he had a myelogram which revealed a 
ruptured disc. On January 21, 1969, Trombetta finally underwent an 
operation. 
Claims were filed against both Lumbermen's Mutual and Hartford. 
There was medical evidence that while the first injury had weakened 
the claimant's annulus or disc periphery, the repeated bending and lift-
• LAURENCE S. LocKE is a partner in the Boston law firm of Petkun &: Locke, and the 
author of the Massachusetts Practice Series volume on workmen's compensation. 
§5.1. 1 1978 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 109, 294 N.E.2d 484. 
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ing of sixty-five pound cement blocks while working for Roberto Com-
pany had aggTavated his condition. An orthopedic surgeon testified that 
while the disc probably ruptured when there was a severe increase in 
pain at the end of the summer, he could not pinpoint the date. On this 
evidence, the Industrial Accident Board found that Trombetta had sus-
tained a personal injury on December 13, 1968, arising out of his em-
ployment with Roberto; and it ordered Hartford to pay total incapacity 
compensation. On appeal, the Superior Court and then the Appeals 
Court upheld the decision of the Board. 
The significance of this case does not lie in its affirmation of the well-
established rule applicable to successive injuries or successive insurers. 
In Massachusetts, only one insurer is chargeable for the payment of 
compensation for a single period of disability. Where an employee has 
suffered two or more compensable injuries, the insurer who was covering 
the risk at the time of the more recent injury bearing a causal relation 
to the disability must pay the entire compensation.2 The Hartford did 
not question that rule. Rather, it denied that Trombetta had sustained 
any personal injury while working for Roberto since at no time did any 
particular incident occur which produced evidence of aggTavation or 
deterioration.8 The Appeals Court dealt squarely with this challenge by 
holding that the ruptured disc need not result from any disabling inci-
dent: "An injury may develop gTadually from the cumulative effect of 
stresses and awavations."4 
There was a firm foundation for the court's decision. In prior cases 
cited by the court, it had been held that a compensable personal injury 
resulted when the cumulative effect of ordinary physical labor caused a 
hernia,G a heart attack,6 a back injury,T or even where adverse lighting 
caused impaired eyesight.s But there was another line of cases holding 
that "the gTadual breaking down or degeneration of tissues caused by 
long and laborious work is not the result of a personal injury within 
the meaning of the act."9 This authority excludes from the concept of 
personal injury disabling conditions occasioned by the employment, re-
sulting from bodily "wear and tear."10 Although it had never been 
2 L. Locke, Workmen's Compensation, 29 Mass. Practice §178 at 2ll et seq. (1968). 
See also Casey's Case, 348 Mass. 572, 204 N.E.2d 710 (1965). 
a 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at IIO, 294 N.E.2d at 485. 
4 Id. at Ill, 294 N.E.2d at 485. 
IS Mills' Case, 258 Mass. 475, 155 N.E.423 (1927). 
6 Brzozowski's Case, 328 Mass. ll3, 102 N.E.2d 399 (1951). 
7 Franklin's Case, 333 Mass. 236, 129 N.E.2d 906 (1955). 
s Pell v. New Bedford Gas&: Edison Light Co., !125 Mass. 239, 90 N.E.2d 555 (1950). 
9 Magge1et's Case, 228 Mass. 57, 61, ll6 N.E. 972, 974 (1917). 
10 Id. (cigar-maker's neuralgia). See also Spalla's Case, 320 Mass. 416, 69 N.E.2d 
665 (1946); Belezarian's Case, 307 Mass. 557, 31 N.E.2d 4 (1940) (wrists); Reardon's 
Case, 275 Mass. 24, 175 N.E. 149 (1931) (Dupuytren's contracture); Doyle's Case, 269 
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explicitly overruled, this doctrine fell into disuse under the modem 
trend of decision in Massachusetts.u In his text on Massachusetts Work-
men's Compensation Law, the present writer commented: 
Although the court has not overruled the doctrine, the degree to 
which the court has departed from it is demonstrated in the Pell 
Case. There the court held that injury to a clerk's eyes from 'many 
years' of insufficient or inadequate lighting conditions was an injury 
due to her employment 'of a compensable class in the light of our 
decisions which have given a broad construction to the word "in-
jury."' After referring to Maggelet's Case, the court said, 'The alle-
gations of the declaration do not make out a case of bodily wear 
and tear.' 
If the injury in Pell is not excluded as 'wear and tear,' it is hard to 
see what is left of the doctrine. Whatever remains need cause no 
hardship or narrowing of the coverage of the act, as today's court 
has indicated that it will not interfere with board awards based 
on a series of strains or a precipitating stress.12 
Relying on several sections of the treatise, the Appeals Court confirmed 
the prediction of the text. It put to rest any possibility that the doctrine 
of wear and tear might receive an unwarranted revival by the court's 
application, as in Begin's CaseP of the doctrine of Maggelet's Case to a 
mental breakdown occurring over a period of many months,14 
Although the doctor in the principal case was, unable to pinpoint the 
date on which the disc had ruptured, and the employee had ceased work 
because he was laid off, the court upheld the board's ruling that the date 
of injury was the last day of work. The board could have found that on 
that day he reached the end of his capacity for work. The court applied 
the rule developed in cases where injury results from the gradual accu-
mulation of foreign matter in the lungs: the date of injury is when the 
employee is finally unable to continue any longer in the work which 
contributes to his disability.111 
For its broad construction of the meaning of personal injury and its 
realistic application in cases of cumulative stress from ordinary work, 
Mass. 310, 168 N.E. 798 (1929) (back); Pimental's Case, 235 Mass. 598, 127 N.E. 424 
(1920) (neuralgia). 
11 L. Locke, supra note 2, §175 at 201. 
12 Id. at 204-05. 
13 354 Mass. 594, 238 N.E.2d 864 (1968). Here the Supreme Judicial Court held that 
emotional disturbance suffered by a correction officer as a result of his employment 
at an institution for the criminally insane and sex offenders was not a personal injury 
within the Workmen's Compensation Act. The Commonwealth, as a self-insurer, 
contended that the Act did not provide relief for "occupational neurosis." 
14 The case is analyzed critically in 1968 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §16.5. 
111 De Filippo's Case, 284 Mass. 531, 188 N.E. 245 (1933); see L. Locke, supra note 
2, §177 at 208-10. 
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Trombetta's Case will become one of the leading cases in workmen's 
compensation law. Its decision demonstrates that the new Appeals Court 
will continue the tradition of liberal interpretation established by the 
Supreme Judicial Court over the last several decades. 
§5.2. Personal injury: Lung diseases from cumulative exposure. 
Massachusetts has no separate occupational disease law. The court early 
adopted a definition of personal injury under the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act sufficiently broad to encompass occupational diseases, and the 
course of decision over the years has broadened and strengthened the 
jurisdiction of the Industrial Accident Board. Therefore, it can now be 
fairly stated that personal injury includes "any injury or disease which 
arises out of and in the course of employment which causes incapacity 
for work and thereby impairs the ability of the employee for earning 
wages."1 Much of the law on this subject was developed in cases in-
volving lung disease from inhalation of minute particles of stone dust 
(pneumoconiosis), silica (silicosis) or other air pollutants.2 Two rescript 
opinions, Moore's Case,8 decided by the Supreme Judicial Court, and 
Reilly's Case,4 decided by the Appeals Court, illustrate the present state 
of the law. 
In Moore's Case the board had awarded compensation to an employee 
who became disabled from pulmonary asbestosis as of January 11, 1968. 
The self-insurer appealed on the ground, among others, that the em-
ployee had been exposed to asbestos while working for an insured sub-
sidiary of the employer from 1952 to 1954. Although not stated in the 
rescript, the thrust of this argument was based on the pathogenesis of 
asbe&tosis: it is a disease of slow growth and development, and it may 
take as long as twenty-five years from the inhalation of asbestos fibers 
for the disease to become symptomatic or disabling. However, the court 
noted that there was evidence that at the later employment in a paper 
mill, the employee was exposed to dust from rolls of paper which con-
tained asbestos, and that a cardiothoracic surgeon gave an opinion that 
there was a causal relationship between the work in the paper mill and 
the employee's disabling asbestosis. On this evidence, the court held 
that the Industrial Accident Board properly awarded compensation from 
the employer as self-insurer when the cumulative effect of the exposure 
occurring between 1952 and 1954 and the later exposure resulted in 
employee disability in 1968.11 The court cited the following language 
from Wnukowski's Case:6 
§5.2. 1 Johnson's Case, 217 Mass. !188, !190, 104 N.E. 7!15, 7!16 (1914). See L. Locke, 
Workmen's Compensation, 29 Mass. Practice, §174 (1968). 
2 See L Locke, supra note 1, §184 at 219-20 (asbestosis); §195 at 2!12-M (lung dis-
eases); § 197 at 2!16 (siijcosis); § 198 at 2!16-!17 (tuberculosis). 
a 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1796, 289 N.E.2d 862. 
4 197!1 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. !19!1, 296 N.E.2d 51!1. 
11 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1796, 289 N.E.2d at 86!1. 
6 296 Mass. 6!1, 5 N.E.2d !I (19!16). 
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This case is similar to a number of cases in which it has been held 
that a gradual accumulation of foreign material in the employee's 
system due to the conditions of his employment, causing definite 
physical harm, may be found to have brought about a compensable 
injury sustained at the time when the employee became unable to 
work.T 
In Reilly's Case,s an award was entered by the Industrial Accident 
Board for an employee suffering from pulmonary fibrosis connected with 
inhalation for over twenty years of naptha and benzine fumes from rub-
ber cement which he applied in liquid form to fabric. On appeal, the 
insurer raised a number of issues, which were largely directed to the 
sufficiency of the evidence that the employee's pulmonary fibrosis resulted 
from his injury.& The Appeals Court affirmed the decree of the Superior 
Court enforcing the Board's award.1o There was medical evidence that 
the pulmonary fibrosis was "secondary to industrial exposure," and was 
"industrially related."11 The rescript opinion emphasized that the em-
ployee was not required to exclude all other possibilities. "Nor was it 
necessary ... that the injurious agent be discoverable in the disease 
itsel£."12 The cases cited by the court deal largely with the sufficiency 
of medical evidence to establish a claim,18 and the discussion closes with 
the observation that "the board's findings must stand if there is any 
evidence to support them, and this court will sustain the general finding 
if possible."14 
Although these cases break no new ground, they are useful illustrations 
of the comprehensive coverage of the Massachusetts Workmen's Compen-
sation Act and its ability to protect employees from occupational haz-
ards, including asbestosis and pulmonary disorders. which are now 
becoming the focus of popular and medical interest as the effect of pollu-
tion in the work environment comes increasingly under public scrutiny. 
7 296 Mass. at 65, 5 N.E.2d at 4. This quotation should be read in the light of the 
evidence that Wnukowski was exposed to noxious dust throughout the period of 
his employment until the day on which he became disabled. Obviously the date of 
injury cannot be later than the last day on which the claimant was exposed to the 
injurious substance. A formula that covers all circumstances would state that the 
employee sustains a personal injury at the time of the last exposure that bears a 
causal relation to the incapacity. See discussion, L Locke, supra note 1, at §177. 
s 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 893, 296 N.E.2d 513. 
9 Id., 296 N.E.2d at 514. 
10 Id. at 394, 296 N.E.2d at 514. 
11 Id. at 393-94, 296 N.E.2d at 514. 
12 Id. at 394, 296 N.E.2d at 514. 
18 The court cites L Locke, supra note 1, §521, at 643. For a full discussion of the 
probative value of medical testimony, see L Locke, supra note 1, §521 at 641 et seq. 
(degree of certainty required) and §522 at 646-47 (credibility; effect of cross-examina-
tion). 
14 1973 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. at 894, 296 N.E.2d at 514, citing Vaz's Case, !142 
Mass. 495, 497, 174 N.E.2d 360, 362 (1961). 
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§5.3. Arising out of: Assault by non-employee: Added-risk cases dis-
regarded: Need to overrule outmoded cases. A personal injury is com-
pensable when "arising out of and in the course of" employment. These 
words, at the heart of the coverage of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 
embody the legislative purpose to provide income replacement for wages 
lost when an employee is injured or killed from an injury related to the 
employment. Whether the incident which produced the disability or 
death should be considered related to the employment is the essential 
controversy in cases construing this phrase. 
The history of judicial interpretation can be divided into two eras 
named after two landmark cases: the McNicol era, limiting protection 
to injuries from a "causative danger ... peculiar to the work and not 
common to the neighborhood;"l and the post-1940 Caswell era, during 
which it was held that "[a]n injury arises out of the employment if it 
arises out of the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of the em-
ployment; in other words, out of the employment looked at in any of 
its aspects."2 The compensability of injuries sustained in an assault is 
a noteworthy example of the change wrought in our law by the replace-
ment of the McNicol doctrine with the modern Caswell doctrine. As-
saults by third persons were not generally treated as arising out of and 
incidental to employment,a particularly where the claimant's voluntary 
acts in any way contributed to the assault.4 The recent cases apply the 
"actual risk" test to assaults: "The question is whether his employment 
brought him in contact with the risk that in fact caused his injuries."5 
In Peters's Case,6 the Supreme Judicial Court again emphasized the 
modern concept of "arising out of" employment in a case involving 
assault by a non-employee. Under Peters circumstances many older 
cases would have denied compensation on the ground that the employee 
had voluntarily incurred a danger outside the scope of his employment. 
By failing to overrule these older cases and merely citing them for com-
parison, the court perpetuated their potentiality for harm or, at the very 
least, for providing a basis for continuing controversy. 
The employee Peters was having lunch with another employee, John-
son, who was a union official, at a location not prohibited for the purpose 
of having lunch. Chapman, a former employee known to both, came in 
§5.3. 1 McNicol's Case, 215 Mass. 497, 499, 102 N.E. 697 (1913); see L. Locke, Work-
men's Compensation, 29 Mass. Practice, §212 at 242-44 (1968). 
2 Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 502, 26 N.E.2d 328, 330 (1940). 
a Harbroe's Case, 223 Mass. 139, 111 N.E. 709 (1916) (watchman mistaken for 
bandit and fatally shot by sheriff); Lee's Case, 240 Mass. 473, 134 N.E. 268 (1922) 
(employee knocked down by friendly jostling of co-employees); but see G.L. c. 152, §26, 
and L. Locke, supra note I, §218 at 258 et seq. 
4 Gavros's Case, 240 Mass. 399, 134 N.E. 269 (1922) (peacemaker struck on head 
trying to stop fight over tools). 
II McLean's Case, 323 Mass. 35, 38, 80 N.E.2d 40, 43 (1948). 
6 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1866, 291 N.E.2d 158. 
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and quarreled with the union official over the latter's refusal to give 
him a transfer card. When Chapman began to assault Johnson, Peters 
attempted to separate them but was unsuccessful. Johnson then shouted 
to Peters to run and have someone call the police. "As Peters ran down 
a passageway, Chapman turned from Johnson and chased after Peters, 
saying he would teach Peters to call the police, and catching up with 
Peters, he beat and kicked him, breaking his leg at the hip. . . ."7 
The Industrial Accident Board found that Peters's injuries arose out of 
and in the course of his employment,s and the court affirmed on the 
ground that his employment brought him in contact with the risk that 
in fact caused his injuries.o 
The full impact of this decision is best demonstrated by analyzing 
the cases cited by the court in its brief rescript opinion. Initially, the 
holding is buttressed by McLean's Case,10 involving a taxidriver as-
saulted late at night by a passenger without any apparent motive, a 
case which is directly on point. However, the court then cited Baran's 
Case,U in which an award to an employee unintentionally shot by a 
stray bullet as he left his employer's mill at the close of the day's work 
was upheld. Baran's Case is generally considered to have introduced the 
"position risk" concept, where the only role played by the employment 
is that it provides the locus for an injury coming from an outside 
source having no relation to the employment.12 The court then cited, by 
way of comparison, Burgess's Case,lS which upheld a decision denying 
compensation to a loose-lea£ service salesman who was shot while run-
ning after a stranger who had just shot his prospective customer, a bank 
treasurer. The court had stated there that "the employee departed from 
the duties of his employment when he voluntarily chased the assailant in 
an endeavor to capture him."14 Although Burgess's Case can be distin-
guished from the principal case on the ground that the employee in 
Peters was trying to get help for a fellow employee still in danger while 
the employee in Burgess was chasing after the assailant after the trea-
surer had already been shot, the distinction seems at best triviaJ.l11 
The court then went on to say that "it is not a bar to Peters's recovery 
that the attack was willful and by a nonemployee ... or that he might 
have avoided the peril of attack by declining to respond to his fellow 
7 ld., 291 N.E.2d at 158·59. 
8 Id., 291 N.E.2d at 159. 
9 ld. at 1866-67, 291 N.E.2d at 159. 
10 !12!1 Mass. !15, 80 N.E.2d 40 (1948). 
11 !136 Mass. !142, 145 N.E.2d 726 (1957). 
12 See, e.g., L Locke, supra note 1, §219 at 263. 
13 331 Mass. 90, 117 N.E.2d 148 (1954). 
14 Id. at 92, 117 N.E.2d at 149. 
111 Burgess's Case was, in the opinion of this writer, wrongly decided and should be 
overruled. See L. Locke, supra note 1, at §218, n.77; §241, n.67; §24!1, n.84. 
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employee."16 This statement introduces the problem of acts performed 
in emergency or rescue situations and leads the court to the verge of 
considering the outmoded and regressive doctrine of "added risk."17 
It first cited Brightman's Case,1s upholding an award where a cook on a 
lighter which had begun to sink at a dock suffered a heart attack from 
the excitement and from his effort in trying to save his clothes and 
personal effects. In this well-reasoned early decision, Chief Justice Rugg 
stated, "[w]hatever it was reasonable for any one to do leaving a sinking 
vessel which was his temporary home was within the scope of his em-
ployment."19 Against the argument that it was rash for a man with a 
a pre-existing heart condition to rush about trying to rescue his effects, 
the court referred to the "instincts of humanity to try to save from a 
sinking vessel all of one's possessions that reasonably can be secured."20 
It then prescribed the standard from which the voluntary act of the 
employee should be viewed: 
The standard to be applied is not that which now, in the light of 
all that has happened, is seen to have been directly within the 
line of labor helpful to the master, but that which the ordinary 
man required to act in such an emergency might do while actuated 
with a purpose to do his duty.2t 
If the court had kept that standard in mind when deciding Burgess's 
Case, the injury would have been regarded as compensable. 
But between Brightman and Burgess there intervened a period of de-
cisional law whichrepresented even a further departure from the intent 
of the act, the so-called "added risk" cases. The court in Peters referred 
to these cases by citing Roberts's Case22 with the cautionary preliminary 
reference to "limitation in Bator's Case ... .''28 Roberts's Case involved 
a painter who had been heating water on a kerosene burner in a bath-
room of the house he was painting. He went outside to continue his 
work, noticed fire coming from the bathroom window, rushed in to 
extinguish the fire and was severely burned. The court reversed an award 
of compensation and, in doing so, stated that the painter's attempt to 
extinguish the fire in the house "was a risk which he voluntarily as-
sumed, but was not a part of the contract of employment or incidental 
to it."24 This rather harsh holding was adverted to in Bator's CaseP' 
16 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1867, 291 N.E.2d at 159. 
17 See L. Locke, supra note 1, §28!1 at !128-!10. 
18 220 Mass. 17, 107 N.E. 527 (1914). 
19 Id. at 19-20, 107 N.E. at 528. 
20 Id. at 19, 107 N.E. at 528. 
21 Id. at 20, 107 N.E. at 528. 
22 284 Mass. !116, 187 N.E. 556 (19!1!1). 
28 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1867, 291 N.E.2d at 159. 
24 284 Mass. at !117, 187 N.E. at 556. 
2ll 3!18 Mass. 104, 153 N.E.2d 765 (1958). 
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to which the rescript had referred by using the word "limitation," in the 
following language: "To the extent that there is anything to the contrary 
in some of our earlier cases like ••. Robert~s Case ••. we are not dis-
posed to follow them."26 But since the court in Bator did not overrule 
Robert~s Case specifically, the court in Peter~s Case was obliged to refer 
to it and distinguish it. 
The rescript opinion then cited Cirame's Case,2'1 presumably to il-
lustrate the extent to which the rule of added risk was abandoned in 
later decisions. In that case a truck driver found himself locked in his 
employer's building at the end of the day and escaped by jumping from 
a ledge outside a second floor window. In a mere rescript and without 
citation of any cases, the court upheld an award for resulting injuries. 
Finally, Peter~s Case cited two cases dealing with income maintenance 
law other than the Workmen's Compensation Act in order to illustrate 
the scope of the emergency and rescue doctrine: Rolins v. Boston & 
Maine Railroad,28 a suit at common law against a non-complying em-
ployer for injuries sustained in an attempt to save an employer's prop-
erty from destruction in a fire, and Teacher~ Retirement Board v. Con-
tributory Retirement Appeal Board/1~ awarding a pension for a teacher 
who suffered a heart attack when he went into a burning high school 
building to obtain examination papers. These casesso and the implicit 
analogies drawn from them illustrate the broad sweep of the decision. 
In short, the court in Peter~s Case held that the assault there involved 
resulted from an actual risk of the employment. The injury was not 
taken out of the protection of the statute because of Peters's voluntary 
actions in running to get a policeman, since those actions were a rea-
sonable response to an emergency involving danger to the safety of a 
fellow-employee ·and were not barred by the modern trend, which no 
longer follows the outmoded doctrine of added risk. The case underlines 
the statement of this writer in his text on Massachusetts Workmen's 
Compensation Law that added risk is a doctrine "withering on the vine." 
It is therefore submitted that the added risk doctrine should be frankly 
set aside and Robert~s Case and its antecedents overruled expressly. 
§5.4. Evidence: Presumption of compensability (G.L. c. 152, §7A): 
Effect of 1971 amendment. In a death case under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act, the claimant has the burden of proving that the de-
ceased employee met his death from a personal injury arising out of and 
26 Id. at 106, 153 N.E.2d at 767. 
27 346 Mass. 783, 196 N.E.2d 222 (1964). 
28 321 Mass. 586, 74 N.E.2d 664 (1947). 
29 346 Mass. 663, 195 N.E.2d 318 (1964). 
so The court also cited Charon's Case, 321 Mass. 694, 75 N.E.2d 511 (1947), which 
held that an injury from fright when lightning struck the machine at which the 
claimant was sitting while eating lunch was compensable. Presumably this reference 
was related to the lunch-time feature of Peters's Case. 
9
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in the course of his employment. In a case of unwitnessed death, it is 
often difficult for the claimant to show that the death resulted from an 
injury that was occasioned by some aspect of the employment. In order 
to aid the claimant in meeting this burden of proof, the Legislature in 
1947 established a presumption of compensability: 
In any claim for compensation, where the employee has been killed 
or is physically or mentally unable to testify, it shall be presumed, 
in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary, that the claim 
comes within the provisions of this chapter .... 1 
The amendment applied to every element of the case and was of great 
help to claimants in many cases.2 However, once substantial evidence 
to the contrary was introduced, it was held that the presumption disap-
peared entirely.8 The case was then in the same posture as if the legis-
lature had never established the presumption; the claimant was obliged 
to meet the burden of proof by relying on direct or circumstantial evi-
dence, which was often impossible to produce. Thus in Riordan's Case,4 
where the employee died of a coronary thrombosis while at work, the 
court held that there was no error for the Industrial Accident Board 
to deny the claim. Substantial evidence refuting the presumption that 
the death was occasioned by the employment had apparently been intro-
duced,11 thus destroying the "artificial force" of the presumption "com-
pelling a finding" in favor of compensation. 
The case is of interest, however, primarily for its reference to a 1971 
amendment to section 7A of chapter 152.6 By that amendment, the Legis-
lature replaced the words "presumed, in the absence of substantial evi-
dence to the contrary . . . ." with the words "prima facie evidence."T 
The amendment did not apply to this case because the claim came up 
for hearing before the effective date of the amendment.& However, the 
court indicated that "prima facie evidence," like a presumption, has an 
artificial force compelling a finding.9 This artificial force disappears 
§5.4. 1 G.L. c. 152, §7A. 
2 See, e.g., cases cited in L. Locke, Workmen's Compensation, 29 Mass. Practice §221 
at 269-70 n.!l (1968). 
a Lysaght's Case, !128 Mass. 281, 10!1 N.E.2d 259 (1952). See L. Locke, supra note 2, 
§221 at 270. 
4 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1802, 289 N.E.2d 8!18. 
II ld. at 180!1, 289 N.E.2d at 8!18. 
6 See 1971 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §4.4. 
T Acts of 1971, c. 702. 
8 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1802, 289 N.E.2d at 8!18. 
9 This construction gives the revised language of §7A greater force than was 
anticipated by this writer in the 1972 Pocket Part, L Locke, supra note 2, §221 
at n.8.5 and §50!1, at 44, where it was erroneously stated that "where the conditions 
of the section are met, the board is always permitted, though never required, to enter 
an award." [Emphasis added.] The construction of Riordan's Case indicates that 
10
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1973 [1973], Art. 8
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when the evidence warrants a finding to the contrary.10 Unlike a pre-
sumption, "prima facie evidence is 'evidence,' remains evidence through-
out the trial, and is entitled to be weighed like any other evidence upon 
any question of fact to which it is relevant.''11 The court, by citing Cook 
v. Farm Service Stores~ Inc.p in which the artificial legal force of 
prima facie evidence is analyzed, has made it clear that the Legislature's 
revision of section 7A accomplished its purpose of insuring that, even 
if evidence is introduced to the contrary, the force of the prima facie evi-
dence remains. Thus, the Board, in its discretion, can find that the de-
ceased employee met his death from injury arising out of and in the 
course of his employment, solely on the basis of the statutorily created 
evidence.18 
where no evidence to the contrary is introduced, prima facie evidence has an artificial 
force compelling a finding. 
10 1972 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1802, 289 N.E.2d at 838. 
11 Cook v. Farm Serv. Stores, Inc. 301 Mass. 564, 566, 17 N.E.2d 890, 892 (1938). 
12 301 Mass. 564, 17 N.E.2d 890 (1938). 
18 See 1971 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §4.4. 
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